# DIPLOMACY CP

### Notes

#### Overview:

The CP tests whether “security cooperation” is needed or desirable. Instead of increasing military assistance, it promotes diplomatic engagement (non-military). That’s not to say it doesn’t try to promote security, it just avoids using military mechanism and personnel. Instead, it cooperates at higher levels, with diplomats and relevant civil sectors.

There are a lot of technical definitions (see T file) that specify security cooperation as Department of Defense (DoD) activities, whereas diplomatic assistance if implemented by the Department of State (DoS). In this case, the CP could be seen as an agent CP. Few affs will specify their agent, so it’s also important to think about the philosophical difference and lean into the cards that define security cooperation as military-to-military engagement.

Two possible net-benefits: one internal and one external. The internal net-benefit is about reducing “creeping militarism” in US foreign policy and reestablishing the credibility of our diplomats. The external net-benefit is that it avoids the Russia DA because diplomatic engagement is more sensitive to political and cultural realities and the perception of the CP will be less aggressive.

#### Pros:

The CP attempts to expose the fact that few aff cards will say “NATO” and “security cooperation” in the same paragraph. Most are about general coordination, cooperation, and shared policy goals. The CP can accomplish all of that without military assistance, especially around emerging tech.

The softer/lefter the aff, the more the CP solves. Any aff that talks about norms, shared principals, data, and other policies not related to weapons systems can be solved by diplomatic action.

The militarism bad/diplomatic cred good NB has good impacts, and you might be able to win it turns the aff.

#### Cons:

The more the aff is about defense capabilities and military responses, the less the CP solves.

The militarization NB is inevitable and non-unique. If Ukraine doesn’t thump, I’m not sure what does.

It probably still links to the Russia DA. The cards about perception and the way military escalate are ok, but Russia/China wouldn’t love any alliance action on emerging tech.

#### To Do:

Specific mechanisms or solvency arguments for specific plans.

More competition cards distinguishing security cooperation from non-security cooperation.

DOD specific trade-off DA. If affs start to own DOD action and craft their advantages around “hard right” military postures, then the neg will need to generate links off of DOD resource tradeoffs.

## 1nc

### 1nc – Text & Solvency

#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic engagement and non-security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in < the area or goal of the plan >.

#### Diplomacy solves better than military assistance – Only non-security cooperation promotes the trust necessary for the plan to succeed.

Stohl ’16 (Rachel Stohl is senior associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center. She served as consultant to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty process. “The Pitfalls of the Pentagon Taking the Lead on U.S. Security Assistance,” World Politics Review, Sept. 20, 2016, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19963/the-pitfalls-of-the-pentagon-taking-the-lead-on-u-s-security-assistance>)

Burkina Faso, a small West African country that most Americans have never heard of and that saw a popular uprising in 2014 and attempted coup a year later, has received more than $4 million in the past 10 years to help professionalize its military. However, even with consistent U.S. security assistance, the State Department reports significant human rights concerns in Burkina Faso, including extrajudicial killings by security forces and excessive use of force, such as torture, against civilians. Burkina Faso is not the only country receiving U.S. security assistance despite a questionable human rights record. Every year, the United States spends billions of dollars on military and security assistance to foreign governments through programs run by both the State Department and the Department of Defense. But in the past 15 years, the scope and magnitude of the Pentagon’s programs have expanded dramatically. Experts now estimate the Pentagon alone spends $8 billion to $10 billion a year on assistance to more than 180 countries—compared to approximately $8 billion a year by the State Department to 147 countries—which has led many to question the apparent militarization of U.S. security assistance and the impact that has on short- and long-term security and foreign policy objectives. Oversight and transparency over these myriad programs are often extremely difficult. Numerous government accounts provide this money, and depending on the program, different congressional committees maintain oversight. The stove-piped nature of U.S. military assistance and the steadfast secrecy that surrounds decisions made for reasons of “national security” often create an artificial division between national security interests and foreign policy ideals. They also make it nearly impossible to identify the exact amount of spending, to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of various programs, and to avoid duplicating resources and efforts across different offices and agencies. This tension between the State Department and the Pentagon is not new. For decades, there have been contradictions between advancing U.S. security interest and foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights. Traditionally, the State Department was the primary decision-maker that determined who received security assistance and for what purpose. Yet all of that began to change after Sept. 11. Before 9/11, Congress had already begun authorizing the Pentagon to support foreign militaries in roles that had long been filled by the State Department. Starting with anti-drug training in the Western Hemisphere, the number and size of these programs has steadily grown since. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the purpose of “train and equip” programs was altered to fill an expanding list of priorities to “build partner capacity,” known as BPC. A RAND Corporation study in 2013 found that of 184 unique authorities that underwrite 165 BPC programs, at least 70 are managed and can be utilized by the Pentagon to provide security cooperation. The mandates of these programs are vast, ranging from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. After 9/11, the Defense Department created military assistance programs to supplement traditional State Department ones. But from the outset, the appropriated funds that support these programs were subject to fewer restrictions than their State Department counterparts. For example, the Pentagon’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program was originally created in 2002 with a mandate that critics claimed served the same purpose as the State Department’s International Military Education and Training program. The Pentagon program provided nonlethal counterterrorism training, but lethal training was made available two years later. Beyond the lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Similarly, in 2006, the Pentagon was authorized to use $200 million of its Operation and Maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations. In creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the defense budget, the Pentagon is, in effect, able to implement its security assistance without applying Foreign Assistance Act restrictions, which are intended to ensure that human rights and other foreign policy concerns are taken into consideration when determining the provision of security assistance. Experts have counted a tripling of military assistance out of the Pentagon budget from 2008 to 2015. That money comes with greater influence. And although the State Department can veto some programs, others are outside its authority, and program planning is not always shared with State Department personnel. After 9/11, the Pentagon gained a larger role, not just because it had the money, but because it was believed that it had the experience and means to react more quickly to changing situations and needs in an expansive and fast growing war on terror. While many of the countries receiving Pentagon military assistance are seen as national security priorities, their behavior often raises foreign policy concerns that make diplomatic engagement difficult. Providing arms to these countries also increases the risk that U.S.-origin weapons could be used against the United States, its soldiers, its allies and/or its interests. In many cases, military and security assistance is provided to achieve short-term security gains, which may undermine long-term U.S foreign policy interests. These issues are compounded by the fact that the Pentagon simply has more money and resources to address these concerns, and it has become easier for it to simply foot the bill. Pentagon spending on military assistance has totaled at least $122 billion since 2001, compared to approximately $119 billion for the State Department. The Security Assistance Monitor, a program of the Center for International Policy that tracks U.S. security assistance to countries around the world, has documented a tenfold increase in Pentagon security aid programs since 2001—from $1 billion in 2001 to $10.8 billion in 2015. State Department spending nearly doubled in that time from $4.6 billion to $8.3 billion. However, it is not the dollar figure that is worth comparing, but rather the meteoric rise of Pentagon spending, as opposed to a more gradual increase from the State Department. This increased spending has made some observers apprehensive. A Congressional Research Service report last May raised serious concerns about the roles of the State Department and the Pentagon with regard to security assistance and reconciling foreign policy objectives with security goals. It highlighted the lack of reporting requirements for Pentagon programs compared to the State Department and the resulting lack of oversight and accounting. In addition, Pentagon programs are not subject to country-by-country public reporting, making understanding a recipient country’s priorities, activities and funding impossible. At least 66 Pentagon programs do not allow any specific country information to be made available at all. Beyond this lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Recipient countries and communities have the impression that help only comes from the U.S. military, which changes the context of assistance and the relationship with those receiving it. The mission and its perception differ depending on whether the help comes from the U.S. military, or instead from the U.S. Embassy, the United States Agency for International Development or other civil servants from various U.S. government agencies. Today, American security assistance has become unnecessarily military in nature, simply because there are additional Pentagon funds and programs that can quickly move money. At a fundamental level, when speaking with members of the U.S. military involved in these types of missions, such as building schools or bridges in African countries, they have recognized that they are simply there to complete their work and to strengthen military-to-military relationships. They often don’t worry about diplomatic aspects or the types of relationships they are establishing. To be sure, developing any relationship, particularly in countries with questionable and at times poor records of democracy and human rights, is important, and military relationships may buy the security that is desired in the short term. But in the long term, without deeper diplomatic relationships and nonmilitary engagement, it will be impossible to achieve larger strategic objectives and foster an environment of trust.

### 1nc – Net-Benefit

#### Security cooperation fuels militarism – that causes miscalculation and turns the case.

Bergmann & Schmitt ’21 (Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at CAP, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, he served in the U.S. Department of State, received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Alexandra Schmitt is a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress REPORT, MAR 9, 2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>)-mikee

Today, U.S. aid to build up a partner’s military should be viewed through the lens of competition between states, in addition to the ongoing counterterrorism concerns and state fragility challenges, with much higher stakes for U.S. foreign policy and national interests. This renewed geopolitical competition is at its core an ideological competition between states. China’s rise and Russia’s resurgence require the United States to realign its foreign policy toward strengthening relations and bolstering democratic states. Security assistance is a tool to do so: It strengthens America’s closest partners and fosters closer relationships with other states. When a country accepts U.S. military equipment or enters into a long-term procurement or acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, they are tying their country to the United States. The U.S. decision, for instance, to provide military aid to the United Kingdom through the lend-lease program in the 1940s was not a simple military consideration but a foreign policy consideration with enormous consequences.7 Today, U.S. decisions to provide weapons or support tie American officials to how that support is used—whether they like it or not—as the case of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen demonstrates. Moreover, countries that receive U.S. military systems are not just buying equipment off the shelf; they are entering into a longer-term relationship with that country for training, maintenance, and sustainment. This is similar to when a consumer buys a smart phone, as they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are reliant on the company to access its broader ecosystem of apps and software and trusting the company to safeguard important data. Over time, a consumer becomes locked in and dependent on a particular provider. Similarly, when a state commits to expanding military-to-military ties—often the most sensitive area for a country—they are making a diplomatic bet on that country. As they base their military on U.S. equipment and U.S. training and engagement, they similarly become locked in to the United States. This sets the ground for more productive American partnerships to tackle a range of geopolitical challenges. For example, U.S. security assistance has been key to building ties with Vietnam after the war between the two countries. American assistance provided to clear unexploded ordnance has helped repair diplomatic relations between Hanoi and Washington, while the recent provision of a retired Coast Guard ship to the Vietnam military can help strengthen military ties and potentially open the door to more U.S. assistance and security cooperation, which will further strengthen bilateral relations.8 There are several reasons that today’s security assistance system must change: Current security policy decision-making perpetuates the status quo. The current system perpetuates an ineffective status quo, whereby the United States often fails to effectively exert significant diplomatic leverage that it has through security assistance because the bureaucratic structure to administer it—both within the State Department and between the State Department and the DOD—is not designed to advance diplomatic efforts but merely to administer appropriated funds.9 This makes it challenging to change security assistance programs given shifting foreign policy dynamics or changes in a partner’s behavior that may make them a less suitable recipient of U.S. security aid, such as democratic backsliding or a pattern of human rights abuses. U.S. engagement with partners could be dominated by military issues if foreign officials turn to DOD counterparts instead of diplomats for assistance resources. Because the DOD controls its own security assistance accounts, other foreign policy concerns may get trumped if partners go around the State Department to get aid from the Pentagon. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) worried at a 2017 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that the shift to increasing DOD authorities could “send a fundamental message that the United States considers security relationships over all other U.S. foreign policy objectives or concerns, including human rights or good governance.”10 Under the current framework, the State Department’s ability to put the brakes on security assistance or military cooperation under DOD authorities is highly limited because the State Department does not control implementation and can often only approve or disapprove of DOD proposals. While State Department officials and ambassadors can and sometimes do halt or temper problematic efforts, doing so requires exerting significant political capital that is in short supply.11 Centralizing control at the State Department would help to fix this bureaucratic imbalance between diplomacy and the Pentagon. Defense priorities often undervalue democratic and human rights concerns. Compared with the State Department, the DOD is less equipped to effectively weigh human rights concerns in its decision-making. This makes it harder to leverage U.S. military cooperation for economic or political concessions or changes that might bolster democratic goals. For example, U.S. military objectives to counter terrorist groups in Somalia called for continuously supplying Uganda with U.S. assistance despite growing human rights and democracy concerns.12 Putting the State Department in charge would make it easier to realign U.S. security assistance toward democratic states and effectively consider human rights issues in every security assistance decision. Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement. As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken. A military-led response can overprioritize military engagement and could unintentionally steer American engagements into high-risk confrontations. Without careful calibration and understanding of broader political context, there is real concern that the DOD could get ahead of U.S. policy or drive it in a more military-centric direction. For example, China could interpret the DOD’s provision of some security assistance through the agency’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as an act of aggression if it is not carefully and effectively calibrated against broader political concerns in the region.15 Given the political sensitivities of great power competition, responsibility and oversight for security assistance decisions should rest with the agency most in tune with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns and diplomatic developments: the State Department. Reforming security assistance by centralizing it at the State Department would help to elevate the diplomatic considerations of this policy area, while reducing the military-first priorities of the current system that are ill-suited to today’s geopolitical challenges.

## Solvency

### S – Generic

#### Diplomacy is best for achieving successful multilateral goals

Powell ’22 (Jo Ellen, career member of the United States Foreign Service who served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources, “Bringing America’s Multilateral Diplomacy into the 21st Century,” Academy of Diplomacy, https://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Bringing-Americas-Multilateral-Diplomacy-into-the-21st-Century-FINAL.pdf)

In his February 4, 2021, address to the U.S. Department of State, President Joseph R. Biden declared “diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy.”1 The President called on the Department of State to meet accelerating global challenges, from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear proliferation, by working in common with other nations. He spoke of global diplomacy, and global power, as America’s inexhaustible source of strength and its abiding advantage. Many perceive that advantage has eroded over the years. Today, the Department of State has a singular opportunity to lead an interagency collaboration to restore that advantage, with the support of the Administration and other interested agencies. To achieve this, the State Department cannot exclusively rely on its traditional model of bilateral diplomacy; multilateral diplomacy must become a greater focus of the Department’s efforts. To effectively address the global challenges the President discussed, the Department must exert equal effort in its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. Although the U.S. remains virtually unmatched in its economic and social influence and power, the gap between it and the competition is narrowing. It is no longer true (if it ever was) that the U.S. does not need a global range of partners to address global crises. China is rapidly extending its presence and influence in international organizations, including international financial institutions, as are other countries, such as Russia and India. The U.S. must build strong and enduring partnerships with countries beyond its traditional alliances, particularly in Latin America and Africa. As political dynamics and world powers shifted, the U.S. response was often to disengage from multilateral diplomacy. Yet, disengagement did not lead to resolution. We must set aside the notion that international organizations excessively constrain or disproportionately burden the United States. To manage the global issues we face today and for the foreseeable future, we need to work with a global coalition of partners, even when not all of them agree with the United States all the time. In considering how to meet these challenges, it is useful to examine how other countries have maximized their multilateral influence. Smaller nations often see international organizations as the most effective way to leverage their influence. The Nordic countries are an oft-cited example of the smart application of multilateral diplomacy, but the U.K., France, Japan, and Germany also give considerable weight and attention to multilateral diplomacy, with highly effective results. These successful practitioners of multilateral diplomacy have several practices and approaches in common. Their diplomats’ entry-level training includes serious emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and negotiation; their career paths often involve multiple assignments to or within international organizations; and their foreign ministries are actively engaged in recruitment and advocacy for placement in international bodies of highly qualified applicants at all levels, from interns to senior executives. Other characteristics they share that the U.S. cannot easily adopt are greater ease of movement between their Civil and Foreign Services and the absence of an “up or out” promotion system. Both sets of characteristics enhance those countries’ flexibility to second personnel to international organizations, and the latter somewhat offsets the nearly universal perception that secondments are not helpful to one’s career. Effective multilateral diplomacy is essential for the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy objectives and effective bilateral engagement is arguably the most critical element of successful multilateral diplomacy. U.S. diplomats must set the standard, not just throughout the U.S. government, but worldwide, for effective multilateral diplomacy. Our recommendations to achieve this fall into three categories: policy, practice, and preparation.

#### Achieving consensus at NATO requires diplomatic, not military, efforts

Burns ’21 (Nicholas, Professor of Diplomacy and IR at Harvard, “A Time for Diplomacy,” *Belfer Center*, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/time-diplomacy)//BB>

Diplomacy also works best when far-sighted leaders take charge of a crisis and point the way ahead. Think of: FDR and Churchill’s organization of a massive global coalition to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Helmut Kohl, Mikhail Gorbachev, and George H.W. Bush’s negotiations to unite Germany in the NATO Alliance and to end the Cold War. Nelson Mandela who used a four-year diplomatic negotiation to dismantle and destroy the apartheid regime. Angela Merkel who led the world diplomatically in confronting and sanctioning Vladimir Putin following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Diplomacy and negotiations, of course, do not always succeed. At its worst, if diplomacy fails, war, lawlessness, and destruction ensue – Vietnam, Rwanda, and Iraq in the past. Syria, Tigray, Myanmar, and China’s power grab in the South China Sea in the present. That is one reason why it is so important to integrate effectively the work of ambassadors and Generals combined with the unique power of intelligence officers. Foreign policy making in the U.S. Government is a team sport. It takes coordination among all the country’s actors to succeed. We diplomats understand that our ability to succeed is often related directly to the intelligence on which we depend and the military partners with whom we share power. It has long been understood that diplomacy and defense are inextricably tied to each other. When I was U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the majority of my staff was from the Pentagon – both the uniformed military and Defense Department civilians. We thought hard about aligning our diplomatic moves with our military might. When we responded to the 9/11 attacks, we drew on the resources of both diplomats and warriors. When NATO went into Afghanistan, we thought of it as a combined military and diplomatic mission. What has been missing in the U.S. government in recent years is a strong, energetic, self-confident diplomatic corps. President Biden and Secretary of State Tony Blinken have shown they appreciate the need to elevate diplomacy as a first-order priority for the United States. From their first days in office, they have emphasized their determination to strengthen America’s diplomatic power in the world. President Biden chose the State Department as the site of his first foreign policy speech. Some of his earliest and most notable appointments immediately strengthened our diplomatic bench behind Secretary Tony Blinken – Ambassadors Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Wendy Sherman, Victoria Nuland, and Samantha Power, as well as an impressive and experienced NSC team led by Jake Sullivan, Jon Finer, Kurt Campbell, Laura Rosenberger, Sumona Guha, and many others. For President Biden’s new emphasis on diplomacy to succeed, however, the career Foreign Service, in particular, will need to be strengthened dramatically. It is no secret that the Foreign and Civil Service are at their lowest points in morale and effectiveness in the memory of anyone listening today in this Zoom room. I began my diplomatic career 41 years ago as an intern at our embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania in the Sahara Desert. I have witnessed many highs and lows of American diplomacy since. Frankly, I have been shocked to see the damage done to the career Foreign Service during the last four years. The result is disastrously low morale, a lack of budgetary support, the debilitating departure of some of our most senior career diplomats, the sidelining of the Service for a time, and the resulting lack of confidence in its future by a younger generation of diplomats who will be most critical to its resurrection. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have a rare opportunity to lead a radical overhaul at the State Department. Under their leadership, this must remain a first-order priority for the administration. In November just following the Presidential election, two former American Ambassadors, Marc Grossman, Marcie Ries, and I released a Harvard Kennedy School report entitled, “A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.” Our goal was to recommend the fundamental steps necessary to reform the Foreign Service and to reposition it for success in the future. Based on conversations with over 200 people inside the U.S. government and beyond in over 40 workshops during the past pandemic year, we reported that the Foreign Service “is confronting one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history.” We recommended a determined, bipartisan effort to revive and restructure it. Specifically, we called for a new Foreign Service Act by Congress to set a renewed mission and mandate for the 21st century diplomatic corps. The last time Congress passed such an Act was in 1980 when the world was a very different place with very different challenges. than it is now. We advocated a “relentless focus on diversity” to counteract the woeful lack of progress in the percentage of African Americans, women, Latinx Americans, Asian Americans and other minorities in the senior ranks of American diplomacy. We called for the creation of a new Diplomatic Reserve Corps and a Mid-Level entry program to ensure the inclusion in the diplomatic ranks of experienced citizens with specialized skills. Given the proliferation of political appointee Ambassadors at the State Department, we also recommended that, by 2025, 90 percent of Ambassadors should be career appointees, not 70 percent as is the current practice. We also recommended that 75 percent of the powerful Assistant Secretary of State positions be held by career officers. During the Trump Administration, not a single one of these Assistant Secretary positions was led by a Senate-confirmed career officer. This was the first time in memory that the Foreign Service had been entirely unrepresented at that critical leadership level. Finally, we proposed to rename the “Foreign Service of the United States” the “United States Diplomatic Service.” We believe it signals transformation and reinforces the vital role our diplomats perform in service to our nation. This new title would begin with the two words, of course, that are most important – United States. A reinforced career diplomatic corps would help President Biden and his successors from either party to revive American leadership in the world. President Biden’s great insight has been to see our alliances as the critical asset we have in this long-term battle for global power and the future of democracy. The NATO Alliance is fundamental to a long-term peace in Europe. It has expanded a zone of security to encompass the great majority of Europeans, East and West. It protects all of us, particularly smaller countries, from the Russian Bear. It will be largely a diplomatic task to return the U.S. to leadership of the Alliance and to maintain allied unity in containing Russia power in the next few days, weeks, months, and years.

#### Diplomacy solves alliance cohesion and achieves foreign policy goals.

Haass ’20 (Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” *Council Special Report* No. 89)//BB

Diplomacy is a critical tool in a nation’s foreign policy tool kit, enabling a country to leverage its power and bring it to bear on critical international issues. The United States’ most enduring advantage over its rivals is its unprecedented network of alliances, and through consultations officials and diplomats maintain these relationships and enlist allies in common causes. Those representing the government are tasked to negotiate treaties, dealing with issues from arms control to climate change, and advance U.S. interests in international organizations. They are the face of America overseas, representing the country around the world and providing critical services to Americans traveling abroad. Too often, however, diplomacy is neglected. Sometimes serious diplomacy is sidelined in favor of unrealistic calls for regime change or demands that the other party cannot reasonably be expected to meet. A related problem, one highlighted by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, is that American foreign policy has become over-militarized, with the military asked to perform missions such as nation-building that it was never intended to. While the Department of Defense receives record appropriations, the Department of State struggles to have its comparatively small budget approved. In this valuable and timely Council Special Report, Jon Finer, an adjunct senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Uzra S. Zeya, the CEO and president of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, propose policies for revitalizing the State Department and American diplomacy. They rightly assess that the Department of State “has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis.” They point out that the State Department is currently enduring turbulence but, equally important, that many of its problems are deep-seated and predate the Donald J. Trump administration. They provide an array of policy proposals they believe the State Department can and should implement to restore American diplomacy. The list of proposals is long, and few readers will agree with all of them. In some cases what is put forward will likely meet with bureaucratic or congressional resistance. What is clear and inarguable, though, is that U.S. foreign policy needs to better recognize and reflect the unique and valuable contributions of diplomacy. The State Department needs to rethink its organization along with the role of embassies and those who serve in them, attract individuals with more diverse backgrounds, skill sets, and experience, and reimagine career paths and training opportunities. The goal should be to attract the best and brightest to the State Department, be it for a career or a stint, and to invest in them so that those designing and carrying out American foreign policy have the creativity and professionalism required to meet the challenges and opportunities of a twenty-first-century world. All of which is to say that revitalizing the State Department should be a priority for the next administration regardless of who occupies the Oval Office.

### S – Emerging Tech

#### The State Department’s diplomatic expertise solve emerging tech issues better – it avoids the security-dominated approach that causes retaliation.

Saeed ‘21, (Ferial Ara Saeed is CEO of Telegraph Strategies LLC, a risk management firm providing clients strategic guidance and analysis of political and economic trends, “A STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THE DIGITAL AGE,” War on the Rocks, JUNE 21, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/a-state-department-for-the-digital-age/)-mikee

But emerging technology policy requires equal consideration of the economic and political challenges that these technologies present in the hands of competitors and adversaries. AI, for instance, could give autocrats greater capacity to manipulate public opinion, destabilize democracies, and monitor their citizens. It makes as much sense for arms control specialists to formulate and drive the required policy responses as it does to ask democracy experts to address the strategic stability questions raised by hypersonic missiles (another emerging technology). Economic interests fare no better. The last administration reached into its security policy toolkit to regulate “the availability of things” in response to China’s unfair practices in the technology race with United States, risking American innovation leadership and economic competitiveness. While some may argue that the administration was responding to the perceived loss of U.S. competitiveness resulting from China’s predatory trade practices, U.S. industry, at the center of the storm, certainly did not see it that way. American technology companies pushed back hard against the worst of these policies on the grounds that they would not only harm their interests but also the U.S. economy, and so undercut the very goals that the administration was trying to achieve. The strategic risks of a security-dominated approach are even broader. Restrictive U.S. policies and China’s responses to them also turned the dial of Sino-American relations decisively towards confrontation. A warier, more critical approach to Beijing is warranted, but Washington has to walk a fine line to keep the complicated mix of rivalry and mutual interests in the relationship from spilling over or prompting hedging by other states. A security-dominated approach to emerging technologies is simply too blunt and too narrow. Arms control specialists, with their focus on security, unquestionably have a critical role to play on such issues as seeking a global prohibition against AI-enabled systems deciding when to deploy nuclear weapons. But leading the State Department on emerging technology policy requires perspective on a diversity of vital U.S. interests that go well beyond security. Technology Policy at the State Department: Too Many Cooks Moving oversight of the emerging technologies portfolio to the deputy secretary of state for management and resources, who has broad responsibilities for policy and management, would be a good start. But it would still not address the bigger organizational challenges that rightly concern Congress. Lawmakers want the department to fix the coordination problems that limit its effectiveness on technology issues, elevate cyber diplomacy as a foreign policy priority, and ensure equal focus on economic, security, and political concerns. Congress also seeks a separate China strategy, given the decisive role of technology competition in Sino-American rivalry. Yet, for all that lawmakers get right about what ails the State Department organizationally, not a single congressional proposal tackles the fundamental problem: the department’s balkanized technology policy landscape, which stretches across more than a dozen regional and functional bureaus. Five undersecretaries divide oversight of this policy sprawl: political affairs, arms control, economic affairs, civilian security, and public affairs. None are technology experts. Each has a mandate, a budget, and bureaucratic turf to protect. Lawmakers are merely tinkering at the margins, proposing the consolidation of some functions or adding new layers of bureaucracy to solve a coordination and integration problem that starts on the ground floor, not inside the boardroom. Without changes at the State Department, a security-focused approach will dominate emerging technology policy. This critical area of foreign policy will resemble an arms control agreement: a maze of constraints, hurdles, and walls. U.S. economic competitiveness will also be at risk because traditional arms control thinking tends to be “prohibitory and regulatory,” so in interagency policy deliberations the State Department will be inclined to support burdensome and expensive new layers of restrictions on business in the interest of security. Of course, it will be important to take security considerations into account when thinking about economic and technology policy toward China. But it should not be the only consideration. Absent important bureaucratic changes, other priorities like promoting internet freedom and international cyber stability will suffer from the absence of high-level attention. Furthermore, while counterpart agencies like the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security build the deep bench of expertise necessary to adapt to an era of geostrategic competition rooted in technology, the State Department will fall further behind in this area — where its leadership is essential to America’s well-being and success. Consolidate Technology Policy Functions Solutions are not simple, but they are obvious. First, the State Department should create a new undersecretary position and bring all technology issues under it, as the congressionally established National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence recommends. The undersecretary should have broad expertise in technology and its applications. Consolidation will improve coordination and rapid decision-making when trade-offs are required, while developing a cadre of tech-savvy cyber diplomats. The department’s large country desks provide proof of concept. They build deep and practical country expertise because they are multidisciplinary. Information is routinely shared among desk officers handling diverse portfolios — political, economic, and security. Political and economic considerations factor seamlessly into security policy, and vice versa. This integrated, coordinated approach makes country desks formidable policy players. They are well-rounded and respected for their knowledge and advocacy of reliably well-coordinated initiatives and positions, road-tested across competing U.S. interests. That is the model to emulate. Second, the State Department should discuss its organizational plans with counterpart agencies — including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, and Energy — something the last administration, according to the Government Accountability Office, did not do. The National Security Council should lead this discussion and specifically address whether federal agencies are handling emerging technology policy with the kind of comprehensive focus it requires, and not merely as an adjunct of cyber security. Third, the new undersecretary should report to the third-ranking official in the department, the deputy secretary for management and resources, a position Congress should mandate that every administration fill. Undersecretaries usually report to the secretary of state, but the reality is that they do not all get equal attention. This alternative structure would ensure consistent, high-level involvement. It would give cyber diplomats the stature to go toe-to-toe with counterparts, both in the U.S. policymaking process and in foreign governments, who would see them as influential representatives of a powerful part of the State Department. Organize for the Present, With a Clear View of the Future America faces a tidal wave of challenges wrought by unprecedented and ubiquitous advances in emerging technologies and the rise of China as an anti-democratic economic superpower. The State Department has a leading role to play in addressing both challenges. Consolidating all technology issues under a single undersecretary would significantly strengthen the department’s hand in the interagency policymaking process. The department is better positioned than its interagency counterparts to articulate a national emerging technology policy that accounts for the full range of U.S. national interests, not just those related to security. Multidimensionality is the State Department’s core comparative advantage. Consolidation would reinforce it. No other agency has the mandate, the expertise, and the credibility to compel consideration of that vital perspective. Without it, the United States risks undermining its complex geostrategic interests with over-securitized responses to rivalry with China and the related, evolving challenges presented by the most rapid technological change ever experienced in human history.

#### New State Department bureau solves expertise and norm development on emerging tech

Bade 22 (Scott, tech and policy analyst @ Eurasia Group “Digital diplomacy gets a reboot,” Tech Crunch, <https://techcrunch.com/2022/04/08/digital-diplomacy-gets-a-reboot/>)//BB

CDP [Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy] will have three policy buckets: international cyber security, digital policy and digital freedom. Each roughly corresponds to preexisting competencies: the cyber coordinator office (created back in 2011), the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, respectively. It will be run by a yet-to-be-confirmed ambassador-at-large; in the meantime, career diplomat Jennifer Bachus will run the team as principal deputy assistant secretary. While the new bureau will deal with the day-to-day, a separate special envoy position will also be created to focus on more long-term issues around emerging and critical technologies like AI, quantum and biotechnology. Missing in action no more? The “decision to stand up a new bureau is an indicator of how seriously [the Biden administration] sees these threats,” Eileen Donahoe, a former U.S. ambassador who now runs the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, tells me. “They understand the need for more thought leadership and diplomatic capacity.” One sign of that seriousness is that both offices will, for at least a year, report directly to Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, the department’s number two official. This is a good thing, says Chris Painter, who was the Obama administration’s top diplomat on cyber issues. Sherman, he says, has a long history with cyber issues and worked to integrate technology issues at regional bureaus she ran earlier in her career. CDP will need that high-level support. The State Department is playing catch up, I’m told, and attempting to bring its expertise — diplomacy and knowledge of international relations — to more technical policymakers at the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and other agencies. The implication is clear: State’s voice has been missing in the interagency process and opportunities have been missed both at home and abroad. For example, as Nate Picarsic and Emily de la Bruyère have written, the U.S. has been largely absent from the politics of the intergovernmental organizations that are quietly setting the global standards of technology. As a result the U.S. has ceded ground to others, especially Russia and China, but even the European Union, with massive implications for who controls the future of technology. And as new international entities emerge, like the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council or the Quad’s technology working group, the State Department needs to be able to coordinate and advise. Under the Trump administration, you “had good, talented people,” working these issues, Painter tells me, “but no one at the leadership level [able] both to deal with the White House and senior counterparts and foreign counterparts. [The new bureau] helps fill that gap.” “This is a real down payment by the department,” says Yll Bajraktari, a former national security official who is now the CEO of Special Competitive Studies Project, an AI advocacy group. “Integrating the department’s capacity for cybersecurity, digital infrastructure and governance issues including internet freedom will help create a coherent diplomatic strategy.”

### S – Cyber

#### Cyber diplomacy is better than cyber security. The State Department can promote norms, capacity building, intelligence sharing and resilience. Solves the aff.

Williams et al ’21 (Brandon Williams with contributions from Veronica Chinchilla, Evan Lisman, Amanda Tobey, and Emilyn Tuomala. Brandon is a PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research. “US. AND ALLIED CY BER SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC,” Center for Global Security Research, March 30, 31 and April 1, 2021, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1787217)-mikee

The workshop's penultimate panel stressed a renewal of innovation in diplomatic practice. An active cyber diplomacy holds the promise of restoring stability to cyberspace, and, for the United States, advocating for a free, interoperable, and secure internet globally. State Department retains the bureaucratic competencies and personnel to enact forward-looking cyber diplomacy, but they have much ground to cover on norm construction, capacity building, and affirming that states follow international law in cyberspace. Diplomacy's most substantial roles are protecting an on-line ecosystem where human rights are respected, restoring stability by reducing incentives for states to act maliciously, and demonstrating U.S. leadership in digital rights and emerging technology. Cyber diplomats at the State Department and DHS cooperate with allies on publicly attributing blame for aggressive cyber acts to state-sponsored APTs. State Department is active in the UN's Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group, lobbying for an internet of information freedom rather than information control by states. Thus far, as one panelist emphasized, the State Department has not yet framed its cyber diplomacy efforts in the realities of the cyber strategic environment. The State Department can make strides in supporting Persistent Engagement by socializing foreign service officers and diplomats, who are the face of diplomacy, to the domain's competitive nature. Shaping international discourse on cybersecurity norms, responsible state behavior, and governance can be best attained by a corps of diplomats who are unified with the United States' cyber doctrine. Norm construction from the bottom up presents the best route to shape global norms. Leveraging agile coalitions of allies to build norms represents a workable solution to adversary intransigence at the UN. Values, by themselves, do not have the power to influence norms against concerted state pressures to assert authoritarian control over the internet. Competitive allied cyber diplomacy can shape the standards and norms that determine the future of the internet. A competitive cyber diplomacy relies on the State Department's core competency in creating bilateral and multilateral agreements for capacity building, threat intelligence sharing, resilience measures, and to promote best practices in a competitive cyber ecosystem. Diplomats understand countries' strategic and political environments, and the State Department has the capacity to scale Hunt Forward operations. USCC [US Cyber Command] encounters limits in growing Hunt Forward. Collaboration between the State Department and USCC may present the best avenue to consensually operate in other countries' networks to observe malicious actors. The State Department will guide the United States' cyber diplomacy, not USCC [US Cyber Command], and integrating cyber authorities will create synergies for how the United States can restore stability in cyberspace and safeguard the United States' cybersecurity.

#### The State Department best shapes global cyber policy. AND, their initiatives are followed by the DoD to keep cyber engagement below thresholds of armed conflict

Goldman ’20 (Emily, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)//BB

The Department of State should contribute more directly to efforts to disrupt, degrade, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior. It can do so by leveraging diplomatic channels to increase routine and agile collaboration with partners and allies for continuous pressure against adversary campaigns below the level of armed conflict. The goal would be to frustrate and thwart cyberspace aggression before it harms the United States and its allies. This approach would allow the United States to be more responsive to great-power competition, enable and sustain similar efforts by the Department of Defense, and complement the cyber deterrence initiative. Closer synergy between promoting norms of responsible state behavior in international venues and conducting persistent cyberspace operations that expose and contest behavior inconsistent with such norms has the best chance of producing a convergence of expectations (i.e., norms) on acceptable behavior. Mutually reinforcing efforts across the U.S. government to deter, disrupt, expose, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior can produce the synergy between defense and foreign policy needed for great-power competition. This, however, requires a reevaluation of cyber diplomacy priorities, activities, lines of effort, and mindset.59 Cyber Diplomacy for Great-Power Competition: Seizing and Sustaining Initiative Political conditions today favor an energetic U.S. diplomatic campaign. Russia and China’s aggressive information, political, and economic warfare campaigns have highlighted the risks to U.S. partners and allies.60 Those allies are eager to improve their cyberspace security and to work cooperatively with the United States. The U.S. government can capitalize on this favorable environment by forging agreements with foreign partners that encourage a deeper level of interaction. The United States can build coalitions for continuous pressure against adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict.61 Such agreements and the joint efforts that follow will normalize collaborative cyberspace operations for mutual defense. Essentially, the State Department needs to operationalize the core objective of cyber persistence: seizing and sustaining initiative. The State Department is uniquely positioned to convene interagency discussions on defining boundaries of acceptable behavior below the level of armed conflict, to forge consensus with allies and partners on boundaries of acceptable competition, and to mobilize international coalitions to enforce those boundaries. It can better enable the Department of Defense to persistently engage and defend forward in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict — a necessary ingredient for constructing norms through interaction. Diplomats should be well-versed in the full range of U.S. cyber activities and explain them to U.S. partners in order to set the international conditions for the United States to compete in a globally interconnected domain. With these goals in mind, the following recommendations are offered as a roadmap for improving U.S. cyber diplomacy.

## Competition

### AT: Perm Do Both

#### The permutation is redundant, inefficient, and continues DoD overlap that encourage militarization, lack of oversight, and miscalculation.

Bergmann ’21 (Max, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, “It’s time to get the Pentagon out of the business of administering U.S. foreign aid,” Washington Post, March 11, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/11/its-time-get-pentagon-out-business-administering-us-foreign-aid/>)-mikee

“Diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy,” President Biden announced last month in remarks that were heartening — and long overdue. But rebuilding the State Department will require more than just elevating career officials and building up a bigger and more diverse diplomatic corps. Shifting the center of power to the State Department requires putting diplomats back in charge of U.S. foreign policy and empowering them with new resources. To achieve this requires ending a byproduct of the post-9/11 era: the Pentagon’s foreign aid program. By law, foreign aid, which includes assistance to foreign militaries, is the responsibility of the State Department. This is for the simple reason that providing arms to another country is fundamentally an act of foreign policy. The State Department’s foreign military financing program has provided roughly $6 billion aid annually to foreign military partners, such as Israel and Egypt, for a half-century. But in the past two decades, the Defense Department has developed its own security assistance program. This happened by accident, not design. A few small niche programs related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq gradually metastasized into larger and broader programs. The trend accelerated during the Obama years. The government saw security assistance as a tool to help U.S. partners cope with instability and terrorism in the Middle East and Africa, Russian aggression in Europe, and China’s bullying of its Asian neighbors. As the administration sought to fund these efforts, it found that the State Department couldn’t get more money from Congress to create these programs. The 2011 Budget Control Act, which President Barack Obama brokered with congressional Republicans, put hard limits on government spending. But while the State Department’s budget was capped, the Defense Department’s contingency budget was not. That meant that the easiest way to fund new security assistance endeavors was through the Pentagon. And the Obama administration found it easier to get a Republican Congress to grant the Pentagon the authorities necessary to provide assistance than it was to get money for the State Department. Once this spigot opened, the Pentagon’s top brass — led by combatant commanders eager to get funding for their regions — descended on Congress. The Pentagon was granted billions in funding, and at least 56 of these new programs required no coordination with the State Department. The result today is that the United States has two distinct security assistance systems — one at the State Department and one at the Defense Department — doing the same thing. That has created a bureaucratic mess involving countless planning and operational conflicts — one that also makes it impossible for Congress to conduct effective oversight, since the two departments answer to different committees. Recognizing the problem, some policymakers in Congress and the Pentagon have recently implemented a few useful reforms — but they go only so far. Today, when combatant commanders show up in the countries they’re assigned to, they frequently have security assistance funding at their disposal. But State Department officials of similar rank often lack comparably flexible funding and yet have to deliver tough messages on other U.S. foreign policy priorities, from human rights to economic reform, democratization or even climate policy. This power imbalance is not lost on foreign partners, and they act accordingly, often tuning out the State Department while cultivating their relations with the Defense Department. The current bifurcated system is not just wasteful — it’s also potentially dangerous. Policymakers originally expanded Defense Department assistance in response to the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism, when security assistance was often seen as a technical tool to smooth collaboration with foreign militaries. But in a new era of global great power competition, the provision of arms to another country sends a loud foreign policy signal, one that can easily lead to miscalculation. Those assistance decisions need to be well coordinated and calibrated by diplomats, not generals.

#### The State Department needs full control of the policy in order to guarantee mission success

Gould ’22 (Joe, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry, For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?,” April 11, 2022, Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2022/04/11/for-americas-security-aid-programs-who-will-run-the-show/)//BB>

Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said. “What is critical is that we have full control over that lever, and not have it be a bureaucratic mess where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing and it’s difficult for any senior policymaker in the White House to know what the hell’s going on,” said Bergmann, now a senior fellow at Center for American Progress. Meanwhile, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle are generally supportive of shifts, arguing for an overhaul of the current setup. “As the Defense Department continues efforts to cut the State Department out of security cooperation, we’ve seen a greater focus on short-term tactical capabilities than on sustainable forces aligned with strategic foreign policy,” Risch said. “We must address governance challenges like corruption in all our activities, and we need to professionalize our security assistance workforce.”

#### Even if both policies are equally resourced, the Department of State will be pushed into the supporting role

Oakley 19, Army strategist and currently serves as an assistant professor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (David, “THE PROBLEMS OF A MILITARIZED FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA’S PREMIER INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-problems-of-a-militarized-foreign-policy-for-americas-premier-intelligence-agency/>)//BB

Neither is Stavridis the first retired military leader to voice this concern. In 2013, future secretary of defense James Mattis, then a Marine Corps general, famously quipped, “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” In 2012, Karl Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general and former ambassador to Afghanistan, argued that the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and an unequal investment in the Defense Department over other departments resulted in the military becoming the “starting and relief pitcher for a number of foreign policy problems.” In a speech at Kansas State University in 2010, Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated his concern with the Defense Department’s increasing role in foreign policy: “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief.” In an earlier interview, Mullen described a vicious cycle of policymakers turning to the military and increasing funding to the Defense Department because they have greater trust in military capability than in other agencies, and this greater funding in turn makes the military even more capable relative to other national security institutions. Instead of correcting a significant imbalance in resourcing national security capabilities, policymakers just turn to the military to handle an increasing array of missions. The military then becomes the lead while other organizations find themselves in supporting roles.

### AT: Perm DCP

\*\*\* Use cards from the T file that define SC as Military

#### The counterplan competes. The plan’s “security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense and military engagement, the CP uses a different agent and engages with different personnel.

#### The CP uses non-coercive measures implemented by civilians, the plan uses the DoD and defense commitments.

Withers et al ‘8 (George, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA, March, https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf)

These changes are not just theoretical. In December 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the increasing role of U.S. defense agencies in leading foreign policy on the ground, and issued a stern warning in a document entitled Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign (S. Prt. 109-52): It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting. Policy Recommendations 1. The next administration should reassert the State Department’s control over foreign military training and assistance programs in its communication with the Congress, in interagency discussions and, most importantly, in the budget it presents for the State and Defense Departments.

#### Budget classification proves it’s military-to-military

Van Eerden 20, Captain (James, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11.1)//BB

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.

#### Even the broadest definitions requires the DoD

Williams 12, Lt Col in Army National Guard (James, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power,” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>)//BB

Similarly, the six Geographic Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) have underscored security cooperation and building partner capacity as essential to their respective Theater Strategy Plans and Country Campaign Plans in support of National Security objectives. In every COCOM posture statement the reader will find references 7 to the importance of the concepts of cooperation, engagement, and building partner capacity. “Security Cooperation” is defined broadly as interactions between the Department of Defense and foreign militaries that promote specific United States security interests; develop allied and friendly military capabilities; and provide the United States with both peacetime and contingency access to host nations.12 Typical security cooperation and engagement activities include military-to-military contact, coalition training, nation assistance and long term operations. These types of activities range from Navy ship port visits to combined training exercises, foreign military education, leader conferences, foreign military sales and counter-drug operations.

## Net-Benefits

### Militarism

#### The plan relies on military forces, which harms diplomacy and encourages escalation.

Early ‘11 (Billy, Lt Col, USAF, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty, Air War College, 16 February 2011, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf>)

After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the United States embarked on a global effort to fight terrorism. Lessons learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq taught the US military the critical importance of enabling other countries to protect themselves from terrorist networks, preventing problems from becoming crises or escalating into conflicts requiring greater US involvement.1 While US foreign policy supports building the capacity of foreign military forces through State Department security assistance programs, the Department of Defense (DOD) views these traditional avenues as too inflexible and slow to respond to the rapidly changing global threat environment, and too poorly funded to meet the growing security requirements. 2 DOD asked Congress to grant it the authority to train and equip foreign military forces in countries around the world where US military leaders saw urgent or emerging threats that could potentially harm US national interests. In 2006 Congress granted the DOD the authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism and stability operations, making DOD the lead for a State Department foreign policy responsibility. Critics charge that this new authority, known as Global Train and Equip, militarizes US foreign policy. Using the US military to build the capacity of foreign military forces can militarize US foreign policy and possibly harm State Department efforts to advance American interests. This paper analyses DOD’s Global Train and Equip authority using three indicators to determine if the militarization of foreign policy exists: (1) use of military force, (2) rates of growth in military versus diplomatic budgets, and (3) shifts of foreign policy functions to the military. Indications of militarization of US foreign policy are then considered against their overall effects on US foreign policy roles and responsibilities to determine if US interests are harmed. The Global Train and Equip authority militarizes US foreign policy by giving DOD a greater diplomatic role in policy determination, but does not weaken the State Department’s ability to implement foreign policy or Congress’s oversight responsibilities. Furthermore, increased DOD involvement in security assistance is a more responsive whole of government approach and a proactive military strategy to respond to emerging threats and shape the global security environment. Militarization of Foreign Policy Militarization occurs when a state relies on the military to pursue national security objectives better achieved by other means.3 The DOD is criticized as having militarized US foreign policy through its new authority to build the capacity for foreign military forces to counter terrorism and support US military and stability operations. The controversy stems from the direct funding and authority now given to DOD, not the State Department which is responsible for US foreign assistance programs. The continuation of this authority, going on its sixth year and already costing more than $1.2 billion, shifts responsibility away from the State Department. Secretary of Defense Gates even warns of a “creeping militarization” of some aspects of American’s foreign policy when discussing the US military’s increased involvement in activities previously done by civilian agencies, and cautions against an overreliance on military combat operations.4 DOD involvement in foreign policy may undermine US foreign policy objectives. A shift in the core functions away from the State Department may have undesirable effects for several reasons. First, it may weaken the State Department’s role in implementing foreign policy. The State Department advances US interests in foreign countries and its authority may be weakened if DOD is also making decisions that impact US foreign policy. Second, it may weaken congressional oversight, particularly human rights protections, a large concern in many developing countries around the world. Congress authorizes and funds State Department-managed military assistance programs. State Department support that goes through the regular foreign assistance budget process is subject to conditions and closely scrutinized. In contrast, support that goes through the defense budget may receive far less review by foreign oversight committees. Third, it gives the Pentagon a greater diplomatic role and significant autonomy over support to foreign military forces, which has the potential to cause stronger military-to-military ties with a country than existing diplomatic ties.5 These effects may harm US foreign policy objectives. However, DOD involvement in US foreign assistance efforts is not without precedence.

### Diplomatic Credibility

#### The CP solves expands diplomatic authority, credibility, and global perception of the Department of State.

Bergmann & Schmitt ’21 (Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at CAP, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, he served in the U.S. Department of State, received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Alexandra Schmitt is a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress REPORT, MAR 9, 2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>)-mikee

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

#### Enhanced diplomatic credibility solves every transnational risk

Burns 20, Goodman Family professor of the practice of diplomacy and international relations, is chair of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Transatlantic Relations, director of the Future of Diplomacy Project, and a co-leader of the American Secretaries of State Project (Nicholas, “The Indispensable Power,” *Harvard Magazine*, https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2020/07/features-forum-indispensable-power)//BB

DIPLOMACY has never been so important as now, when we are confronting the most serious crises since the Second World War: the global pandemic and economic collapse. When we emerge finally from the grip of the coronavirus, Americans will need to account for a public-health disaster that has killed well over 100,000 people to date and shuttered nearly every institution in our society (including Harvard) for much of the spring and into the summer. But we’ll also need to look beyond our borders to assess what went wrong globally. Why did the World Health Organization—its long and continuing record of expertise in matters of global health notwithstanding—not press China more aggressively to tell the truth about the virus in early January? How should nations be better prepared for a possible second wave? Can they agree to share a vaccine equitably among the world’s 7.7 billion people? Will the major economies collaborate to prevent the current recession from turning into another Great Depression? The answer to these questions will depend in large measure on our ability to work diplomatically across the world in this multi-front struggle. As a former career Foreign Service officer, I have spent four decades of my professional life representing the United States overseas and teaching about America’s role as the indispensable power in the international arena. For much of that time, the nation leaned heavily on its unmatched military might—during the Cold War, after 9/11, and in the Afghan and Iraq wars. Now, with the spread of the coronavirus to every inhabited continent, diplomacy’s time has come in the reconstruction of a more stable and better world. Unfortunately, restoring the role of U.S. diplomacy won’t be easy. One early casualty of the pandemic is our plummeting credibility as the unmatched global power. For the first time since World War II, America has chosen not to lead in confronting a quintessentially global threat. With American energy and confidence in short supply, President Donald Trump is a spectral figure on the world stage as nations struggle to contain the virus. Instead of leading the G-20 major economies against the contagion, the world has watched an American president castigate China for birthing the “Wuhan Virus,” pin the blame for the failed response on the World Health Organization, and—as one of my European students lamented—fail even to offer a simple word of sympathy in all those endless news conferences to those dying in Italy and Spain and other bedrock allies. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has long maintained that America should place its diplomats out in front (“on point” in the military vernacular), with the armed forces in reserve, to be used only when diplomacy fails. Powell’s dictum is an important reminder of how the United States should seek to lead in this time of pandemic, for the coronavirus is only one of many among a new type of threat that requires us to lead as much through the power of diplomacy as through that of the military. Many of the students I teach point to transnational threats that affect every nation and person on earth as our greatest challenges: climate change, food and water shortages, narcotics and crime cartels, the lack of cyber security, and pandemics top the list. We cannot succeed in containing them without forming diplomatic alliances among governments, universities, foundations, businesses, and citizens. This new brand of diplomacy is not an alternative to the military but its logical partner in the twenty-first century American arsenal. The military remains essential to fight terrorists, and to counter rivals Russia and China and outlaw governments in North Korea and Iran, but even in these cases we have to have robust diplomacy to achieve our aims. Even if we deployed the full might of the U.S. military to eliminate the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and the regimes that support them, does anyone believe that would, by itself, “solve” the problem? Even in those cases, deft, multilateral diplomacy will have to play a lead role—as recent experience has shown. We can no longer default to force alone, as we have done so often since 9/11. A Foreign Service for 2030 AMERICA’S DIPLOMATIC EFFECTIVENESS rests, in large part, on the women and men of the U.S. Foreign Service—more than 11,000 career officials in more than 280 embassies and consulates and at the State Department in Washington, D.C. They are our primary interface with foreign governments, businesses, and citizens. They adjudicate immigrant and non-immigrant visas and refugee admissions to the United States. They help American businesses overcome barriers to foreign trade and investment. They manage difficult war and peace challenges in every corner of the world—from daily challenges to the most intricate, strategic matters vital to our national security and prosperity. Diplomatic collaboration also underpins our ability to advance the more positive scientific, technological, and societal trends that can sustain the historic alleviation of poverty worldwide, promote women’s rights, and realize the promise of a carbon-free economy. Just when we need to turn to diplomacy, however, the Foreign Service is experiencing one of the greatest crises in its long history. Some of the damage has been caused by prior Democratic as well as Republican administrations. The United States is the only major country that fills a third or more of its ambassadorial assignments with political appointees, often poorly qualified, from outside the career ranks—often depriving the country of the advantages it could secure with expert, professional, nonpartisan diplomatic representation around the world. That mistake has only accelerated, with the current administration appointing the lowest percentage of career ambassadors in more than half a century. Former generals and admirals have been appointed to ambassadorships that would otherwise be filled—as they should be—by civilian officers. The politicization and militarization of our foreign policy by both parties is a genuine problem. More broadly, the Foreign Service has been substantially weakened and is in need of major repair. Even as the Trump administration’s budget requests for the Department of Defense rose from $686 billion to as high as $718 billion during its first two years, it sought to slash the State Department’s budget by up to a third. The administration fired several of America’s most senior and experienced diplomats early in 2017 and sidelined countless others, triggering an exodus of officers of every rank. The president himself has castigated career diplomats as the “Deep State.” Unsurprisingly, morale has crashed and young Americans’ applications for the Foreign Service have fallen to just under 10,000 from a high of 31,000 in 2003—a worrisome indicator that our nation’s ability to attract superb diplomatic talent is being eroded. Re-Imagining American Diplomacy THE KENNEDY SCHOOL launched an ambitious, nonpartisan initiative this winter—A New American Diplomacy for the 21st Century—to address these concerns and spark a national conversation about the future of the Foreign Service. I am working with former Foreign Service colleagues, Ambassadors Nancy McEldowney, Marc Grossman, and Marcie Ries, to issue a major public report after the November presidential election. We have organized online meetings with hundreds of current and former officials, business and nonprofit leaders, and everyday citizens to discuss ways to strengthen the career service. American diplomacy needs a major generational update. Since 9/11, Congress and three administrations have reformed the U.S. military and intelligence services and created the Department of Homeland Security. But collectively, they did little to re-imagine diplomacy’s role in the American arsenal. During the last century, there have been just three efforts to modernize the U.S. diplomatic corps: in 1924, 1946, and 1980 (when Congress passed the last major State Department Authorization Act). In our vastly altered geo-strategic environment, 40 years later, it is time to renew the mission of the Foreign Service. Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Mahmoud Abbas, September 22, 2009, at the Waldorf Astoria, New York City Photograph by John Angelillo-Pool/Getty Images We can mine America’s long diplomatic history for inspiration. Drawing on my own experience, I recall, as a young intern at the U.S. embassy in Mauritania, seeing first-hand the respect and influence President Jimmy Carter earned as the first U.S. leader to make Africa a priority. A decade later, when I served at the National Security Council with responsibility for the Soviet Union, I witnessed President George H.W. Bush negotiate the peaceful end of the Cold War and Bill Clinton consolidate the triumph of democracy over communism. President George W. Bush launched the bipartisan PEPFAR initiative to help in the fight against HIV/AIDs, polio, malaria, and other deadly diseases in Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere (a useful precedent when thinking about what it will really take to combat the coronavirus, not only in the developed nations, but in those with far fewer economic and healthcare resources). It was on 9/11, however, as U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that I learned one of the most powerful lessons about diplomacy. Just a few hours after Al Qaida terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon, my phone started to ring at NATO headquarters outside Brussels. My Canadian colleague, David Wright, called first—followed by the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Germany, Italy, and many others. Each asked, “What can we do to help?” Those were very welcome words on the single darkest day in recent American history. By the next morning, invoking Article 5 of the 1949 NATO Treaty for the first time in history, all of the NATO-allied countries came to the rescue of the United States—lending mighty political and diplomatic support to the military response that would come later. Our allies considered Osama Bin Laden’s attacks on New York and Washington as an attack on them as well. Their militaries all went into Afghanistan with us (the majority remain 19 years later—and they and other partner nations have suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths; we owe them a lot). Contrary to such evidence, the current president believes the United States is strongest when it acts alone—unburdened of allies and partners whom he views as relics of our Cold War past. I lived the history of 9/11 and draw a very different lesson about the value of allies to the United States. Why would we want to live alone in a troubled and dangerous world, without the benefit of friends and allies by our side? Our NATO allies, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, act as multipliers of American power in the world. They provide a lifeline of military, economic, and political support when we often need it most. They represent the great power differential between the United States and our rivals Russia and China, who can count on no such allies when the chips are down. As we recover from two decades of war and COVID-19’s assault on our society and economy, we will need to look at our global role in a new way. The era when America could run the world by fiat has vanished. We are still the strongest economic, military, and technological power—but China, India, and others are gaining on us. We can no longer overpower our adversaries in every crisis. And although we will need to call on the military to defend us in the future, we will more often than not need to outwit and outmaneuver adversaries through the strength of our diplomats and our alliances—not to mention mustering support for those broader, nonmilitary crises we now face, from pandemics to climate change.

### Democracy/HR

#### Harms democratic progress and enables human rights violators

Bergmann & Schmitt ’21 (Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at CAP, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, he served in the U.S. Department of State, received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Alexandra Schmitt is a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress REPORT, MAR 9, 2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>)-mikee

Harms democratic progress and enables human rights violators Current security assistance policy, divorced from other foreign aid considerations, hampers pursuing this values-based policy and does not effectively elevate human rights and democracy concerns in the decision-making process. This is dangerous because the United States ends up supporting autocratic regimes with serious governance and stability challenges. Yemen, for example, received more than $300 million in security assistance through the DOD’s train and equip authority between 2010 and 2015, yet researchers documented human rights abuses perpetrated by the government and possible diversion of U.S. aid.67 Worse still, the perception that U.S. aid was fueling conflict led much of the Yemeni public to believe that the United States was primarily responsible for the destruction of the Saudi-led coalition in the current war.68 Today, the conflict in Yemen is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. An overly militarized security assistance policy makes it harder to support emerging democracies. Building up security forces without accompanying reforms to strengthen civilian oversight can lead to coup-proofing or consolidation around a political leader, rather than the development of a competent force.69 Often, these impacts are not prioritized by security assistance practitioners; for example, the DOD’s relative spending on building up partner security institutions, such as the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, was $32.6 million in fiscal year 2019, compared with $1.9 billion of overall spending.70 At the same time, the DOD’s investment in institutional capacity building far exceeds the State Department’s investment in these efforts—an example where the State Department will have to incorporate and improve on the DOD’s practices. While U.S. laws technically prohibit providing security assistance to units found to violate human rights—the Leahy laws—the provisions are riddled with loopholes and are too weak to effectively prioritize human rights in U.S. security assistance.71 Offices and agencies responsible for elevating human rights in U.S. foreign policy, such as the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, are too often cut out of the decision-making process for security assistance programs—especially those run out of the Pentagon. At the same time, the Pentagon maintains its own security assistance accounts, such as Section 127e, that are not required to conduct human rights vetting and operate with little transparency—furthering opportunities to militarize foreign policy.72 And often, such as in the case of Egypt, security assistance is accompanied by paltry amounts of democracy, human rights, and governance funding (DRG), or certifications on human rights are waived entirely, to make providing arms more palatable.73 These small DRG funds or certification stops do little to change the underlying political challenges or are sometimes even hampered by the regime the United States is funding.

#### Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war---the US is key.

Lee ’18 (Carrie; is an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College and a Security Fellow with Truman National Security Project. Any views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, Air University, or Truman National Security Project; *The Truman Project*; September 10th; “Why Democracy Promotion is in the Strategic Interest of the United States”; [https://medium.com/truman-doctrine-blog/why-democracy-promotion-is-in-the-strategic-interest-of-the-united-states-ae959c111b2f](about:blank); accessed 7/9/19; MSCOTT)

However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. Democracy promotion in particular serves a key role in safeguarding U.S. interests and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, democracies protect private property in important ways, invest in public goods, are more politically stable, make for more dependable allies, and empirically do not go to war with one another. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting. Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to investor confidence and growth. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for protecting private property than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a particularly attractive type of country for investors — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system encourage entrepreneurship and small business development, both of which are key to a growing and modernizing economy. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard. Democracies also invest in public goods at much higher rates than autocratic governments. Because politicians must cater to the median voter, they approve policies that invest in public education and healthcare, both of which promote long-term growth and development. Public education invests in a country’s human capital, setting the stage for long-term innovation, adaptability, and advancement. Public healthcare, meanwhile, has been shown to increase overall societal productivity and well-being as people take fewer sick days, citizens are able to afford their healthcare without going bankrupt, and ultimately, the overall costs of healthcare are driven down as citizens become healthier. Productive, innovative societies are also better for the United States — innovation around the world improves global quality of life, results in more educational and vocational opportunities for Americans (both because other universities and jobs become more attractive to Americans who want to go abroad and because potential immigrants are more likely to want to stay in their own country, opening up opportunities for U.S. citizens at home), and may reduce friction between countries over resources and labor. Democracies are also generally more politically stable because regular election cycles ensure an established process for the habitual and peaceful removal of leaders from power. Elections ensure the non-violent transition of power and reduce the need for mass protest, rioting, and revolution — which makes countries more politically stable. Further, when citizens are granted rights and protections from government abuse, enforced by an independent judiciary, they have fewer grievances against the government and are thus less able to mobilize large numbers of people to violently overthrow the regime. Revolution, while not always violent, often leads to political instability, challenges to growth, increased incentives for diversionary war and conflict, and oftentimes civil war. The externalities of civil war and international conflict then put pressure on the United States to intervene, protect human rights, and otherwise expend resources on other countries’ issues. Further, civil wars are highly destructive to institutions, human capital, and resources, and can have significant security spillover effects, increasing global risk of political instability and violent extremism. This political stability, in addition to institutional checks and balances, makes democracies better international partners and allies in the long-term. Treaties ratified by multiple branches of government are more durable than executive agreements signed by a single leader who may be replaced within a short period of time. While democracies may be more reluctant to commit to alliances and formal security pacts, once a party to them, they are more dependable than other states with concentrated power at the executive level. These kind of durable commitments are of interest to the United States as it seeks to preserve the liberal world order; it is far more effective to ally with partners whose institutions make withdrawal from the alliance costly. Finally, it has been empirically observed that democracies do not go to war with one another. While there is a robust debate around the exact nature of the so-called “democratic peace,” it appears that there are qualities particular to democracies that make war between them particularly unlikely: a dovish public constrains leaders’ ability to wage war, competitive elections and a free press make it easier to credibly communicate resolve to potential adversaries, consolidated democracies tend to be more wealthy and economically interdependent, like-minded people are more hesitant to wage war against one another, and so on. Regardless of the precise mechanisms, however, a world of democracies is inherently safer, more prosperous, and less likely to initiate a war against the United States — a key factor in protecting American security and interests.

### AT: Links to the NB

#### Perception matters – The CP avoids militarization and gets better results

-this links to the perm as well)

Bergmann & Schmitt ’21 (Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at CAP, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, he served in the U.S. Department of State, received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Alexandra Schmitt is a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress REPORT, MAR 9, 2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>)-mikee

Contributes to the militarization of foreign policy The current security assistance system contributes to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Militarizing foreign policy entails the increasing use of the military to solve foreign policy challenges and results in a bloated DOD budget with more resources and authority. Researchers describe it as a phenomenon whereby “the military more and more becomes the primary actor and face of U.S. policy abroad,” leading to a cycle in which the DOD requires and receives significantly more resources than any other foreign policy agency and is thus increasingly relied on to solve U.S. foreign policy problems.62 There are several elements of a militarized foreign policy in today’s security assistance system, but primarily, the DOD’s control of significantly more security assistance resources puts the Pentagon—rather than diplomats—in the driver’s seat in policymaking. The Pentagon’s significant resources also distort the face of U.S. security assistance on the ground. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official, warned, “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas. If American engagement wears a uniform … that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.”63 Recipient countries can utilize this to their advantage; foreign officials may more eagerly seek to follow through or make progress on DOD requests or priorities, such as going through with a significant military exercise or a ship visit, while ignoring or slow-rolling State Department requests or priorities, such as releasing a dissident or altering an economic regulation. And if the interlocutor that matters in relations with the United States is the military, the subject that matters is defense. The Pentagon’s priorities can therefore end up carrying more importance with partners than the State Department’s broader foreign policy concerns, making combatant commands more powerful than any diplomat. When the State Department is deprived of resources, or cut out of the decision-making process entirely, diplomats cannot effectively weigh in on whether a proposed sale or package makes sense given a range of other nonmilitary concerns that may exist in a bilateral relationship. In short, money is power, and the DOD has the money. The net effect is that U.S. foreign policy is less coherent, with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign policy concerns. For example, the DOD’s U.S. Africa Command posture review is being conducted with little to no coordination with the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.64 Yet the United States still has serious security and geopolitical interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is “an important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you’re doing a disservice to the larger strategic objectives.”65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized solutions.

#### Even if the counterplan seems like a minor distinction, it has a crucial bearing on how assistance is executed and perceived

Withers et al ‘8 (George, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA, March, https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf)

Why Does It Matter Whether Defense or State Controls Military Aid Programs? The question of whether military aid and training programs should be funded by the Defense Department or the State Department may seem, at first glance, to be a subject more suited to civics textbooks than public debate. Yet the outcome of this debate will have a crucial bearing on how U.S. power is exercised and projected around the world. Let’s take a look at some examples from Latin America. n In 2006-2007, the congressional foreign operations subcommittees, which govern only State Department-funded military aid, learned about killings of civilians and other human rights violations by the Colombian army, which receives a annual military aid package. Responding to the subcommittees’ concerns, which invoked conditions in the foreign aid law, the State Department was forced to withhold temporarily $110 million worth of aid and training. More importantly, the State Department had to ask the Colombian government to take steps to curb killings of civilians by the army and to increase so-far glacial progress in investigating and prosecuting members of the armed forces credibly alleged to have committed crimes such as torture, murder, or collaborating with brutal illegal paramilitary forces. Only 25% of State Department- funded aid was subject to these conditions, so the overall aid program was not strongly affected, but human rights concerns played a more prominent role in the U.S.-Colombian government dialogue. On the other hand, all military aid through the Defense Department continued to flow during this time period, and no visible sign of any concern about human rights abuses emerged from the Armed Services Committees or Defense Appropriations subcommittees, which govern the aid flowing through the Defense Department. Had most military aid and training flowed through the defense bill, the U.S. government’s voice on human rights would have dropped to a whisper.4

#### The plan creates the perception of the US as a military-focused hegemon, the counterplan promotes a more peaceful diplomatic-focused perception

Withers et al ‘8 (George, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA, March, https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf)

Why, one might ask, shouldn’t the military budget be the source of U.S. military aid overseas? The short answer is that equipping and training the world’s armies is a major foreign policy decision. For example, The choice to train and equip foreign militaries is perceived as a U.S. endorsement of those militaries. The relative balance of economic and military aid to a country affects perceptions about how the United States chooses to project its power. Strengthening a military can affect the balance of power within a geographic region, and within a country. The association of the United States with a particular military, especially one engaged in human rights violations, affects the image of our country. Instead of the regional and diplomatic considerations which concern the State Department, the Defense Department’s assigned mission requires it to adopt a military focus on potential national security threats. Military training and aid decisions, as a significant part of foreign policy, should be governed by the agency in charge of foreign policy and diplomacy—the State Department. And they should be overseen by the congressional committees whose jurisdiction is foreign affairs.

## AFF ANSWERS

### Perm DCP

#### Security cooperation includes DOS activities.

Early ‘11 (Billy, Lt Col, USAF, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty, Air War College, 16 February 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf)-mikee

Security Cooperation The US military shapes the global security environment and safeguards US interests through military engagement with foreign militaries. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, threats to US security have shifted from a two-power major theater war to regional, ethnic, and religious conflicts. To counter these threats, the US military found it necessary to interact with foreign militaries using special operations forces which are best suited to handle these new relationsbuilding efforts.11 Therefore, in 1991 Congress granted DOD direct authority for special operations forces to train with foreign militaries.12 Seeing benefit from building these relationships, the US military continued to promote its engagement strategy which shifted towards working with new and emerging democracies. In 1998 DOD institutionalized planning for military engagements by requiring geographic combatant commanders to publish Theater Engagement Plans.13 Military engagement maintained a narrow, regional focus until former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld introduced Security Cooperation Guidance in 2003 to unify guidance and prioritize department efforts. Today’s DOD guidance reflects changes since 2005 requiring all combatant commanders to publish engagement plans and outlining a broad range of peacetime activities that fall under DOD security cooperation efforts. These include all DOD funded engagements with foreign militaries such as combined exercises, training, and education, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and information operations. Security cooperation also includes security assistance programs which fall under State Department funding and policy direction, namely Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET).14 After 9/11 security cooperation efforts grew rapidly mostly due to DOD activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but threats from global terrorism necessitated significant changes be made to US security assistance efforts.

### No Solvency

#### Diplomatic assistance causes political backlash---that wrecks solvency

Kralev ’20 (Nicholas, Executive Director @ the Washington International Diplomatic Academy (WIDA), “Why Politicians Don’t Trust Diplomats,” <https://diplomaticacademy.us/2020/06/14/kralev-why-politicians-dont-trust-diplomats/)//BB>

So politicians’ lack of trust in the Foreign Service is based on perceptions that are largely divorced from reality. Like most Americans, they know very little about our diplomats. In a challenge to such a conclusion, previous administrations have often pointed to entrusting a few senior Foreign Service officers, including William J. Burns and Thomas R. Pickering, with top State Department posts as an example of the respective president’s reliance on professionals. That may speak of these officers’ capabilities, but it doesn’t make up for sidelining or ignoring the service as an institution. At least Bush and Obama understood that having held a prominent position under an administration of the other party is also a part of a career diplomat’s job. For example, Bush appointed R. Nicholas Burns ambassador to NATO and later undersecretary of state, even though Burns had been State Department spokesman under Clinton. And Obama appointed Victoria Nuland an assistant secretary of state despite her earlier role as a close adviser to Dick Cheney, Bush’s vice president. In contrast, Trump has retaliated against officers who held key positions during the Obama administration. Politicians’ decades-long distrust of the Foreign Service has significantly undermined the authority of the professionals and ultimately weakened U.S. diplomacy globally. The very real danger that there won’t be enough properly trained diplomats to restore America’s clout in the future worries us at the independent Washington International Diplomatic Academy. So much so that, although we were set up to offer short-term courses, we’ve decided to start a one-year post-graduate practical training program for people who aspire to become diplomats — the first such effort outside government. Our instructors, all former senior Foreign Service officers, have a lot to teach.

### Department of State Fails

#### The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, \*American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, \*\*American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” *Council Special Report* No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

#### State Department assistance fails

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” *The Heritage Foundation*, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-shift-security-cooperation-state-department)//BB>

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged. Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

### AT: Militarization Impact

#### No link to militarization – plenty of checks.

Early ‘11 (Billy, Lt Col, USAF, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty, Air War College, 16 February 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf)

Conclusion Building the capacity of foreign military forces to counter terrorism and conduct stability operations is DOD’s strategy to promote the security of the United States.63 DOD’s direct authority to train and equip military partners promotes US national security, but it risks moving the United States toward a more militarized US foreign policy. Risks are mitigated because the State Department’s ability to implement US foreign policy remains strong through its close relationship with DOD and direct involvement in security assistance programs. Congress also remains engaged with yearly debate over the appropriate whole of government approach to promoting US security interests. Militarization of US foreign policy through security assistance exists but is managed through the continuous interaction and teamwork between DOD, the State Department, and Congress.

### Military Cooperation Good

#### Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

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Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

#### Military-first should be the objective for all security assistance

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-shift-security-cooperation-state-department)//BB>

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations. Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging—or compelling—State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

### AT: Diplomatic Cred Impact

#### No diplomacy impact and too many alt causes

C. Richard Neu 13, senior economist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, 2/8/13, “U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch,” <http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-punch.html?utm_campaign=rand_socialflow_twitter&utm_source=rand_socialflow_twitter&utm_medium=socialflow>

This is a small example of what may be a troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S. “soft power” and on the country's ability to shape international developments in ways that serve American interests. The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP. The United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999—by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international trade. And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the University of Chicago have demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policy—on the rise as a result of political squabbling over U.S. fiscal policy—typically foreshadows slower economic growth. Investors may be growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state of U.S. fiscal policymaking. From the beginning of 2002, when U.S. government debt was at its most recent minimum as a share of GDP, to the end of 2012, the dollar lost 25 percent of its value, in price-adjusted terms, against a basket of the currencies of major trading partners. This may have been because investors fear that the only way out of the current debt problems will be future inflation. The dollar has also given up a bit of its dominance as the preferred currency for international reserves among advanced economies. And the renminbi appears to have replaced the dollar as the “reference currency” for most of East Asia. (The good news is that in recent years U.S. banks have increased their share of deposits from foreigners, mostly at the expense of banks in London.) More troubling for the future is that private domestic investment—the fuel for future economic growth—shows a strong negative correlation with government debt levels over several business cycles dating back to the late 1950s. Continuing high debt does not bode well in this regard. But perhaps the worst consequences of U.S. debt are actions not taken. U.S. international leadership has been based, in part, on contributions—political and financial—to major institutions and initiatives —International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world better. But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts at coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new free-trade area. And warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his European counterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get your own house in order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent that it can no longer lead? And what about unmet needs at home—healthcare costs, a foundering public education system, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A strained fiscal situation that limits resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be helping with any of these matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified action abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example? America's fiscal predicament is serious. The problem has become obvious in the last few years, but it has been building for decades, largely the result of promises of extensive social benefits without a corresponding willingness to pay for them. Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a number of years—increased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal adjustment and constrained government resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet further.

#### Single instances of action do not change international perceptions of the US.

Fettweis 8 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

### AT: Democracy/HR Impact

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war --- increases hostility.

Ghatak et al. 17—Sam Ghatak is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold is a PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins is a Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville [“External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159, Emory Libraries]

Conclusion

It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently.

This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.

#### Democracy is resilient, but it solves nothing.

Doorenspleet 19 Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243]

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8 . Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8